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ScienceDirectRight-wing populist parties have been particularly successful in
East-Central Europe in the second decade of the 21st century.
We explain this phenomenon using a demand—supply
framework. We review studies about characteristics of East-
Central European nationalism and intergroup tensions with
minorities on the psychological demand side and the anti-
immigrant political discourse on the political supply side. We
conclude that the success of right-wing populism can be
explained by a high, but unstable national identity in the
region’s countries based on the experiences of the fragile
national sovereignty, the deeply embedded and socially
acceptable (i.e. normative) intergroup hostilities with minorities
(especially toward the Roma minority), and the effective use of
immigrant threat in this context.
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Successful mobilization by nationalist far-right politics is
not unique to East-Central Europe (i.e. the former social-
ist countries of Europe), as far-right parties have been
massively successful in Western Europe as well. In fact,
support for genuine far-right parties (e.g. Greater Roma-
nia Party, Slovakian National Party, Ataka in Bulgaria)
tends to be more volatile in East-Central Europe than in
the West. However, these parties endorse ideologies far
more extreme than their Western European counterparts.
The main difference is that nationalistic and exclusionist
discourses of populist right-wing parties are mainstream
and represent the center of the political spectrum in East-
Central Europe [1,2,3]. In line with this, mainstreamwww.sciencedirect.com right-wing populist parties have turned ideologically and
rhetorically into genuine far-right parties, especially since
the refugee crisis in 2015 [4]. Indeed, the rise of right-
wing populism corresponded with the trend of growing
ethnic nationalism only in this region, according to data
from consecutive waves of the International Social Survey
Programme [5].
To further elaborate the differences, firstly we must
acknowledge that right-wing populism in East-Central
Europe is embedded in the historically unstable national
identities based on territorial insecurities, whereas West-
ern European right-wing populism capitalizes from inter-
group conflicts within the national contexts. Right-wing
nationalist ideologies are therefore inseparable from ter-
ritorial revisionism and the fear of extinction of the nation
(i.e. collective angst) [6]. According to Minkenberg [2],
this can be explained by the unfinished process of nation-
building in East-Central Europe which is connected to its
turbulent history in which most of the time, nations
experienced limited or no sovereignty. Secondly, conser-
vatism is ideologically and psychologically different in the
region than in Western Europe, due to the heritage of
socialism. Core conservative attitudes (resistance to
change and anti-egalitarianism) are often connected to
a wish to ‘be taken care of’ by a powerful authority on
both sides of the political spectrum due to socialist
nostalgia [7]. Conservativism in this sense is more dis-
persed on the political spectrum, and strongly attached to
fear of change and norm-violating or culturally different
out-groups [8]. In this context, right-wing populist leaders
can successfully emerge as ‘entrepreneurs of identity’
(i.e. leaders who depict themselves as representing the
experiences of their followers, rather than as skillful
leaders or politicians, see Ref. [9]), exploiting fears of
cultural changes.
For these reasons, anti-democratic political trends can
especially effectively deepen social, economic, and polit-
ical divides and fuel prejudice in this historically unstable
region. In the current review, building on the concept of
nationalism, existing intergroup tensions with historical
minorities (e.g. Roma people and other minority national
groups), and the recent emergence of anti-immigrant
political discourse, we explain the success of right-wing
populism by a demand—supply match (for a review of
far-right politics from a supply—demand approach, see
Refs. [10,11]. Although the demand—supply dynamic is a
universal model for right-wing populism, as it takes hold
in unstable social contexts and amid identity fearsCurrent Opinion in Behavioral Sciences 2020, 34:29–33
30 Emotion, motivation, personality and social sciences *political ideologies*throughout the world, in this paper we investigate the
unique historical and social characteristics that character-
ize the region and generate locally relevant questions
regarding the rise of right-wing populism.
To address these local questions, on the demand side, we
review recent work on national identity and nationalism,
describe the nature of prejudice toward historical minori-
ties and other target groups as the psychological ante-
cedents of right-wing populism, and on the supply side,
we show how threat messages used by right-wing populist
politicians in the mainstream could lead to unprece-
dented levels of xenophobia even in the absence of
tangible immigration boosting the popularity of radical
right parties (for a visual presentation of the process, see
Figure 1).
The demand Side
National identity and nationalism in East-Central Europe
Theories of national identity distinguish between posi-
tive attachment to one’s nation on the one hand, and an
exclusionary, inflated, and uncritical view of the national
ingroup on the other (building on Adorno et al.’s [12]
distinction of true and pseudo-patriotism). This distinc-
tion indicates that nationalism is not simply a stronger
form of identification, but something qualitatively
different. Studies about collective narcissism capture
the ambiguity of a strong, but unstable ingroup identity
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The circular connection between nationalism, intergroup prejudice that
makes people susceptible to threat, which leads to growing right-wing
populism that.
Current Opinion in Behavioral Sciences 2020, 34:29–33 [13]. This need creates hostility toward all people who
represent an internal or external threat to the group [14].
The salience of national identity and nationalism in East-
Central Europe has been shown in a number of recent
studies. A study conducted among Polish participants
revealed a stronger connection between collective narcis-
sism and external threat (in the form of belief in anti-
Polish international conspiracies) than between ingroup
positivity and external threat. When collective narcissism
was accounted for, ingroup positivity was no longer con-
nected to these beliefs [15]. In contrast, in the context of
Hungary, Kende, Hadarics and Szabo´ [16] showed that
both the mode of identification (attachment versus glori-
fication) and the content of identity (nation versus Eur-
ope) matter: ingroup glorification always predicted higher
hostility, however, there was a difference between attach-
ment with Europe and attachment with Hungary. The
first predicted positive, whereas the latter predicted neg-
ative attitudes toward immigrants. In Slovakia, one study
found that the perception of a cultural threat to identity
was a strong predictor of negative attitudes towards
refugees — unlike perceived economic threat and mod-
ern racism that did not add anything to the explanatory
value of identity-based cultural threat [17]. From
these studies, it seems that prejudice and intergroup
hostility are rooted in both nationalism and its milder
form of national attachment or cultural identity in the
region, underlining that exclusive nationalism is more
mainstream in the region.
The stronger connection between national identity and
intergroup hostility may be explained by the specific
content of national identity. Definitions of the nation
as an imagined community reflect the unique character-
istics of the historical, political, and cultural context [18]
that individuals adapt to different degrees. If membership
in a nation is defined in exclusive terms, a mere sense of
belonging can also predict intergroup hostility [19]. Citi-
zens of Western countries embrace their national pride in
democratic political institutions more strongly than citi-
zens in Eastern countries [20], suggesting the existence of
differences in national identity content that in turn can
affect intergroup attitudes and hostility.
Prejudice against historical minorities
In East-Central Europe, questions of belonging have
been contested for national minorities even before the
birth of nation states. Ethnic tensions have been ampli-
fied by the peace treaties of the First World War – which
redrew all borders of East-Central Europe – and the
repression of the communist regime. Anxieties connected
to social transformations regarding national citizenship in
the post-communist period have shaped political deci-
sions regarding minorities. This is most prominently
reflected in punitive solutions in connection with the
Roma, the largest ethnic minority group of the regionwww.sciencedirect.com
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ual-level attitudes clearly indicate that prejudice against
various out-groups have been high in the region compared
to other parts of Europe in the past decades (Special
Eurobarometer, 2015: https://data.europa.eu/euodp/en/
data/dataset/S2077_83_4_437_ENG), and closely con-
nected to national identity [22].
The level of prejudice is not simply an aggregate of
individual attitudes of a country’s citizens. Prejudice
(the way it is expressed and the choice of its targets) is
also a strategic expression of ingroup identity in the sense
that intergroup attitudes can be both unacceptable forms of
behavior (i.e. prejudice) and acceptable forms of conduct
[23]. This means that the harsh treatment of certain groups
can be considered a rational response to perceived norm
violations and not considered problematic. This is particu-
larly relevant for prejudice against Roma people (i.e. anti-
gypsyism, for the term, see European Commission against
Racism and Intolerance, https://www.coe.int/en/web/
european-commission-against-racism-and-intolerance/
recommendation-no.13) in East-Central Europe. It is rec-
ognized as a form of prejudice when it is manifested in
violence, but it is generally tolerated when expressed as
‘reasonable antigypsyism’ [24].
Roma people (also referred to as Gypsies) constitute the
largest ethnic minority group in Europe, making up 5–
10% of the population in Slovakia, Romania, Hungary,
Serbia and Bulgaria [25]. Despite a long, shared history
with the Roma in East-Central Europe, Roma people
represent a marginalized social group that faces discrimi-
nation in all areas of social life [26]. Recent studies
conducted in Hungary and Slovakia found that prejudice
against the Roma is highly normative and acceptable.
This is underlined by the way prejudice is expressed
against them, that is, through traditional negative stereo-
types, and the fact that people do not adjust their level of
prejudice to external expectations [27]. La´sˇticova´ and
Findor [28] point to the risks and limitations of relying
on individualistic approaches when trying to reduce prej-
udice in highly hostile social contexts. Orosz et al. [29]
offer additional support for the importance of social norms
in shaping attitudes toward the Roma by demonstrating
the predominantly negative content of personal dis-
courses about Roma people consisting of negative stereo-
types, threats and dehumanization. Decades of antigyp-
syism research suggest that antigypsyism is a stable
attitude consisting of traditional negative stereotypes
and held by the majority of the population in all countries
of East-Central Europe [30,31].
It must be noted that antigypsyism and hate crimes
against Roma people are common in other parts of Europe
too. What makes the context different is that antigypsy-
ism has become the cornerstone of political mobilization
in some countries, such as in Hungary, Slovakia, andwww.sciencedirect.com Bulgaria [3,32]. This was enabled by a normative context
that is permissive with antigypsyism and prejudice
against groups that are perceived as norm-violating or
culturally different [7]. Against this historical and political
backdrop, fears over the emergence of the arrival of ‘new
strangers’ only exacerbated the general animosities
towards minorities, and mobilized people’s generalized
prejudice [33], making prejudice and the norms of




positive attitudes toward immigration appear in countries
with a larger Muslim immigrant population, more liberal
integration policies, and greater state support of different
religious practices [34]. In line with this, hostility toward
Muslim immigrants is highest in countries unaffected by
immigration and terrorism, such as in East-Central Europe
[35]. In this region, we can observe a form of ‘Platonic
Xenophobia’ (i.e. hatred of Muslim populations without
their presence, (https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/
hungary/2015-07-30/scaling-wall), or the fight against the
‘imaginary Muslims’ (https://www.brookings.edu/research/
imaginary-muslims-how-polands-populists-frame-islam/).
The path chosen by most East-Central European countries
in response to the refugee crisis of 2015was the politicization
of immigrant threat and the mobilization of the electorate
based on these messages [36,37]. This rhetoric is not unique
to the region (see for example the case of Italy: https://www.
brookings.edu/research/muslims-in-the-west-and-the-rise-
of-the-new-populists-the-case-of-italy/), but in the de facto
absence of immigrant populations from Muslim countries, it
is merely a psychological manipulation based on the histori-
cally foundedfear of the nation’s disappearance and threat to
its sovereignty (i.e. collective angst) which are genuine
historical experiences of people in this region. In East-
Central Europe, where national sovereignty has been con-
tested and fears over territorial losses are still strong, nation-
alistpopulismcanmobilizeagainstminoritiesbasedonthese
particular fears [2] rather than for example economic threat.
Traditionally, mobilization against historical minorities,
such as Jews, the Roma and national minorities was the
dominant strategy of radical right parties. Therefore, the
influx of refugees to Europe from the Middle East in
2015 gave momentum to populist radical right parties who
could capitalize on existing prejudices [38] and the nor-
mative contexts that allow the open expression of preju-
dice. The political exploitation of immigrant threat led to
spectacular electoral successes for populist right-wing
parties. It is not surprising that anti-Muslim and anti-
immigrant rhetoric helped secure the electoral victory of
two mainstream parties (PIS in Poland and Fidesz in
Hungary) and created space for the rise of xenophobic
players in the mainstream – contrary to Western Europe
where mainly the radical parties could capitalize from theCurrent Opinion in Behavioral Sciences 2020, 34:29–33
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rhetoric in Hungary, at a time when Europe was still
dominated by ‘wilkommenskultur’, exceeded expecta-
tions. However, apart from the Law and Justice Party
in Poland and Fidesz in Hungary, other politicians who
exploited anti-immigrant sentiments had electoral suc-
cesses as well, such as Czech President Milosˇ Zeman in
2018 (http://eprints.gla.ac.uk/156782/1/156782.pdf). Say-
yid [39] argues that the Czech case fits well into the
pattern that Islamophopic mobilization works well in
countries where the Muslim minority is negligible, but
people can be mobilized by threat. The author recalls that
President Zeman warned Czech citizens about a
‘superHolocaust’ that Muslim refugees were planning.
Recent studies, using opinion poll data and international
databases, suggest that xenophobic propaganda by right-
wing populist politicians, representing mainstream poli-
tics in most East-Central European countries, did not
only coincide with the successful mobilization of voters,
but also with an increase in intolerance. Thereby, we can
assume that propensity to external threat due to the
unstable contents of national identity can be described
not just as a linear process, but also as a circular one (see
Figure 1). The most recent waves of ESS data suggest
that the refugee crisis has deepened the gap between the
prejudice levels in new (Eastern) and older (Western)
member states of the EU (http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/
bueros/budapest/14181-20180815.pdf), despite the fact
that Western Europe was much more exposed to the
refugee crisis as the real target of asylum-seekers. Com-
parative research shows that hostile attitudes towards
immigrants have become much stronger in some East-
Central European countries than in most Western coun-
tries [40]. In all of the Visegrad countries (Czech Repub-
lic, Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia), a significant rise in
xenophobia was measured [41].
Conclusions
Using the demand—supply framework to capture the
match between the psychological needs of individuals
and the dominant political discourse and success of parties,
we reviewed the concept of nationalism and issues related
to prejudice in the context of East-Central Europe, and the
recent success of the use of anti-immigrant rhetoric by
right-wing populist parties. We have shown that although
the demand—supply framework may be a universal char-
acteristic of right-wing populist mobilization, both sides
have unique elements in the East-Central European
region. The psychological demand is different because
national identity has been historically unstable, encapsu-
lating a genuinely founded fear ofextinctionboth culturally
and territorially, making East-Central European citizens
susceptible to collective narcissism and nationalist ideolo-
gies. Because of the content and instability of national
identity that needsconstantdefending, theharsh treatment
of ethnic and national minority groups tends to be sociallyCurrent Opinion in Behavioral Sciences 2020, 34:29–33 permissible, easily justified, and even mainstream. In this
normative context intergroup hostility is not even neces-
sarily recognized as prejudice. This is evidenced by the
marginalized position and policies regarding Roma people
and tensions with national minority groups in the region,
but also by the more exclusive policies against refugees.
Within this context, right-wing populist leaders could not
make extreme claims about the threat immigration from
Muslim countries represent that was not acceptable for a
broad public, and consequently capitalize on the influx of
refugees in Europe in 2015 to a greater degree than any
Western European political movements did, even in the de
facto absence of immigrants, refugees or a culturally differ-
ent Muslim population.
Conflict of interest statement
Nothing declared.
Acknowledgements
This work was supported by the Ja´nos Bolyai Research Scholarship of the
Hungarian Academy of Sciences for Anna Kende.
References and recommended reading
Papers of particular interest, published within the period of review,
have been highlighted as:
 of special interest
 of outstanding interest
1. Minkenberg M: Transforming the Transformation?: The East
European Radical Right in the Political Process. Routledge; 2015.
2.

Minkenberg M: The Radical Right in Eastern Europe: Democracy
under Siege? New Springer; 2017.
This book gives an overview of the radical right parties and movements in
post-socialist Central Eastern Europe from a comparative political
science perspective, looking at similarities and differences to Western
European far-right movements. The main argument of the book is that the
radical right in Eastern Europe is more extreme than its Western counter-
part for at least two reasons: the unfinished process of nation-building
and the nature of the transition process. The book also analyzes the
impact of the radical right on policies, and argues that ideas of the radical
right are more part of the mainstream in the region than in the West.
3. Mudde C: Racist Extremism in Central & Eastern Europe.
Routledge; 2005.
4. Mudde C: Europe’s populist surge: a long time in the making.
Foreign Aff 2016, 95:25-30.
5. Larsen CA: Revitalizing the ‘civic’and ‘ethnic’distinction.
Perceptions of nationhood across two dimensions,
44 countries and two decades. Nations Nationalism 2017,
23:970-993 http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/nana.12345.
6. Wohl MJA, Squires EC, Caouette J: We were, we are, will we be?
The social psychology of collective angst. Soc Pers Psychol
Compass 2012, 6:379-391 http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1751-
9004.2012.00437.x.
7. Aspelund A, Lindeman M, Verkasalo M: Political conservatism
and left–right orientation in 28 Eastern and Western European
countries. Political Psychol 2013, 34:409-417 http://dx.doi.org/
10.1111/pops.12000.
8. Hadarics M, Kende A: The dimensions of generalized prejudice
within the dual-process model: the mediating role of moral
foundations. Curr Psychol 2018, 37:731-739 http://dx.doi.org/
10.1016/j.ijintrel.2018.03.006.
9. Reicher S, Haslam SA: The politics of hope: Donald Trump as an
entrepreneur of identity. In Why Irrationa l Politics Appeals:
Understanding the Allure of Trump. Edited by Fitzduff M. Praeger;
2017:25-40.www.sciencedirect.com
Xenophobia and right-wing populism Kende and Kreko´ 3310. Norris P: Radical Right: Voters and Parties in the Electoral Market.
Cambridge University Press; 2005.
11. Pirro AL: The Populist Radical Right in Central and Eastern Europe:
Ideology, impact, and Electoral Performance. Routledge; 2015.
12. Adorno TW, Frenkel-Brunswik E, Levinson DJ, Stanfor NR: The
Authoritarian Personality. Harper & Row; 1950.
13. Golec de Zavala A, Cichocka A, Eidelson R, Jayawickreme N:
Collective narcissism and its social consequences. J Pers Soc
Psychol 2009, 97:1074-1096 http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/a0016904.
14. Golec de Zavala A: Collective narcissism and intergroup
hostility: the dark side of ‘in-group love’. Soc Pers Psychol
Compass 2011, 5:309-320 http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1751-
9004.2011.00351.x.
15. Cichocka A, Marchlewska M, Golec de Zavala A, Olechowski M:
‘They will not control us’: ingroup positivity and belief in




Kende A, Hadarics M, Szabo´ ZP: Inglorious glorification and
attachment: national and European identities as predictors of
anti- and pro-immigrant attitudes. Br J Soc Psychol 2019,
58:569-590 http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/bjso.12280.
In two survey studies, the authors compared the effect of the mode of
identification (glorification versus attachment) and the content of identity
(national versus European) on anti-immigrant and anti-Muslim attitudes in
Hungary.Thetwostudiesconsistentlyshowedthathigher ingroupglorification
regardless of content, and higher national attachment predicted more hostility
toward immigrants and Muslim people, but stronger attachment to Europe
was associated with less negative attitudes. The second study indicated that
the connection was mediated by Eurosceptic attitudes, presumably because
EU policies regarding immigration are perceived as incompatible with national
interests, explaining why national attachment even without the glorification
component was associated with anti-immigrant attitudes.
17. Renner W, Thomas A, Mikulajova´ M, Newman D: Threat
perception and modern racism as possible predictors of
attitudes towards asylum seekers: comparative findings from
Austria, Germany, and Slovakia. Int J Bus Social Res 2018,
2018:10-22 http://dx.doi.org/10.18533/ijbsr.v7i12.1081.
18. Anderson B: Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origins
and Spread of Nationalism. Verso; 1983.
19. Wagner U, Becker JC, Christ O, Pettigrew TF, Schmidt P: A
longitudinal test of the relation between German nationalism,
patriotism, and outgroup derogation. Eur Sociological Rev
2012, 28:319-332 http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/esr/jcq066.
20. Hjerm M: National sentiments in eastern and western Europe.
Nationalities Papers 2003, 31:413-429 http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/
0090599032000152933.
21. Stewart M: The Gypsy “Menace’’: Populism and the New Anti-
gypsy Politics. Columbia University Pres; 2012.
22. Dimitrova R, Buzea C, Ljujic V, Jordanov V: Nationalistic
attitudes and perceived threat determine Romaphobia among
Bulgarian and Romanian Youth. Revista de AsistenÛa Sociala
2015, 3:33-47.
23. Durrheim K, Quayle M, Dixon J: The struggle for the nature of
“prejudice”: “prejudice” expression as identity performance.
Political Psychol 2015, 37:17-35 http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/
pops.12310.
24. Van Baar H: The emergence of a reasonable anti-gypsyism in
Europe. In When Stereotype Meets Prejudice: Antiziganism in
European Societies, , vol 2014. Edited by Agarin T. Columbia
University Press; 2014:27-44.
25. Mizsei K: Development opportunities for the Roma in Central
and Southeast Europe–impediments and challenges. Comp
Econ Stud 2006, 48:1-5 http://dx.doi.org/10.1057/palgrave.
ces.8100144.
26. Fraser A: The Gypsies. edn 2. Blackwell; 1995.
27. Kende A, Hadarics M, La´sˇticova´ B: Anti-Roma attitudes as
expressions of dominant social norms in Eastern Europe. Int J
Intercult Relat 2017, 60:12-27 http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.
ijintrel.2017.06.002.www.sciencedirect.com 28. La´sˇticova´ B, Findor A: Developing explicit measures of
stereotypes and anti-Roma prejudice in Slovakia: conceptual
and methodological challenges. Hum Aff 2016, 26:233-252
http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/humaff-2016-0022.
29. Orosz G, Bruneau E, Tropp LR, Sebestye´n N, To´th-Kira´ly I,
BÅthe B: What predicts anti-Roma prejudice? Qualitative and
quantitative analysis of everyday sentiments about the Roma.
J Appl Soc Psychol 2018, 48:317-328 http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/
jasp.12513.
30. Enyedi Z, Fa´bia´n Z, Sik E: Is prejudice growing in Hungary?
Changes in anti-semitism, anti-Roma feeling and xenophobia
over the last decade. In Social Report 2004. Edited by Kolosi T,
To´th IG, Vukovich G. Ta´rki; 2004:363-385.
31. Weinerova´ R: Anti-gypsyism in the Czech Republic: Czechs’
perception of Roma in cultural stereotypes. Acta Ethnographica
Hungarica 2014, 59:211-221.
32. Pirro AL: Digging into the breeding ground: insights into the
electoral performance of populist radical right parties in
Central and Eastern Europe. East Eur Politics 2014, 30:246-270
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/21599165.2014.886565.
33. Zick A, Wolf C, Ku¨pper B, Davidov E, Schmidt P, Heitmeyer W: The
syndrome of group-focused enmity: the interrelation of
prejudices tested with multiple cross-sectional and panel
data. J Social Issues 2008, 64:363-383.
34.

Schlueter E, Masso A, Davidov E: What factors explain anti-
Muslim prejudice? An assessment of the effects of Muslim
population size, institutional characteristics and immigration-
related media claims. J Ethn Migr Stud 2019:1-16 http://dx.doi.
org/10.1080/1369183X.2018.1550160.
Using European Social Survey data from 2014 and 2015, the authors
identify and compare predictors of anti-Muslim prejudice across Eur-
opean countries. Firstly, they identify that anti-Muslim prejudice is higher
in East-Central Europe than other countries (highest in Hungary and
lowest in Sweden). The findings suggest that anti-Muslim prejudice is
lower in countries with a higher Muslim population, more liberal immigra-
tion policies, and higher state support of religion (with the exception of
Hungary, Czech Republic and Lithuania where both state support of
religion and anti-Muslim prejudice are high. However, unlike previous
research suggested, they found no connection with the amount of
negative news reports about immigration.
35. Strabac Z, Aalberg T, Valenta M: Attitudes towards Muslim
immigrants: evidence from survey experiments across four
countries. J Ethn Migr Stud 2014, 40:100-118 http://dx.doi.org/
10.1080/1369183X.2013.831542.
36. Kreko´ P, Enyedi Z: Orba´n’s laboratory of illiberalism. J Democr
2018, 29:39-51 http://dx.doi.org/10.1353/jod.2018.0043.
37. Przybylski W: Can Poland’s backsliding be stopped? J Democr
2018, 29:52-64 http://dx.doi.org/10.1353/jod.2018.0046.
38. Tausch A: Muslim immigration continues to divide Europe: a
quantitative analysis of European social survey data. Middle
East Rev Int Aff 2016, 20:37-50.
39. Sayyid S: Islamophobia and the Europeanness of the other
Europe. Patterns Prejudice 2018, 52:420-435 http://dx.doi.org/
10.1080/0031322X.2018.1512481.
40. Simonovits B, Szeitl B: Attitudes towards migration and
migration policies in Hungary and Europe (2014–18). In




Cichocki P, Jabkowski P: Immigration attitudes in the wake of the
2015migrationcrisis inthe Visegra´dgroupcountries. Intersections
2019, 5:27-47 http://dx.doi.org/10.17356/ieejsp.v5i1.480.
Using European Social Survey data from 2014 and 2016, the authors
examined the connection between core values and opposition toward
immigration in Czechia, Hungary and Poland. They found that in both
waves, universalism was negatively associated with opposition to immi-
gration, however the two waves yielded to vastly different results con-
cerning the connection between value-based concerns for security and
opposition to immigration. Whereas there was no such connection in
2014, security concerns and attitudes toward immigration became clo-
sely connected in 2016. The authors explain these findings by a change in
public discourse regarding immigration which revolved around security
issues in the post-2015 period.Current Opinion in Behavioral Sciences 2020, 34:29–33
